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The Outlook for Social Security 
in the Wake of the 
1983 Amendments
Alicia H. Munnell* 
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
Twice during the last ten years, social security's financial 
problems have thrust the system onto the front page of 
newspapers and the cover of weekly magazines. Questions 
were raised about the program* s ability to continue to pay 
benefits and some observers predicted the system's imminent 
"bankruptcy." Yet now, only a year after the peak of the 
whoopla, the social security program is out of the headlines 
and few question its financial soundness. This seems like an 
appropriate time to explore what led to the recent financial 
crises, how the changes enacted in 1983 restored financial 
balance according to the intermediate assumptions of the 
system's Board of Trustees, and what are the major areas of 
uncertainty that necessarily attend any estimates of income 
and expenditures over a 75-year period.
/. The Social Security Program Today
The social security system consists of three programs 
financed through separate trust funds. The Old-Age and 
Survivors Insurance (OASI) program, which pays benefits to 
retired workers, their dependents and survivors, is the largest 
program and will dispense $158 billion in benefits to 32 
million beneficiaries in 1984 (see Table 1). The Disability In 
surance (DI) program, which awards benefits to disabled 
workers and their dependents, will pay $17 billion to roughly 
4 million beneficiaries in 1984. The third program, Hospital
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SOURCE: Social Security Administration, 1983 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and
Disability Insurance Trust Funds (Government Printing Office, 1983), Table 20, p. 60, Table 22, p. 64, Table 28, p. 75.Table A3, p. 93, Table
A4, p. 95; 1983 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund (GPO, 1982), Table 6, p. 31; and data
from Office of the Actuary and Division of Medicare Cost Analysis.
a. Beneficiaries with monthly benefits in current-payment status as of June 30th.
b. Includes both aged and disabled eligible individuals. As of July 1, 1973 hospital insurance protection was extended to disabled persons who
had been on the disability rolls for 24 months.
c. Reserves in OASI, DI and HI trust funds at end of period.
d. Estimated by Office of the Actuary, November 16, 1983, using Intermediate Assumption II-B.
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Insurance (HI), pays benefits to individuals covered by 
OASDI and the Railroad Retirement program. Benefit 
payments from this fund will amount to $46 billion in 1984. 
Most HI beneficiaries also participate in the voluntary Sup 
plementary Medical Insurance (SMI) program. The follow 
ing discussion will center primarily on the Old-Age, Sur 
vivors, and Disability portion of the program, since this was 
the area addressed by the National Commission on Social 
Security Reform and subsequently by Congress in its 
deliberations on the 1983 Amendments.
The social security system is financed on a pay-as-you-go 
basis. The 120 million active workers and their employers 
pay taxes to finance the benefits for the 36 million retired 
and disabled workers and their dependents and survivors. 
The idea is not to build up a large reserve from which 
benefits will be paid, but rather to accumulate sufficient 
funds to provide a buffer against brief, unanticipated 
economic fluctuations. At one time it was thought that a 
reserve equal to one year's benefits would be appropriate, 
but since 1970 the trust funds have held substantially less 
than that amount.
Generally, the smallness of trust fund reserves should not 
be a source of concern in a social insurance program as it 
would in a private insurance plan. Because private plans can 
not be certain of receiving future premiums, they must have 
adequate funding procedures to meet all prior and current 
commitments. In contrast, the social security system is a 
mandatory and permanent program which can rely on the 
government's taxing power to meet its obligations and can 
levy taxes on successive generations of workers to pay for 
retirement, disability, and hospital benefits. Thus, the 
system has evolved into a compact between generations, each 
generation depending on the next one to finance promised 
benefits.
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II. Reasons for the Financial Problems
Pay-as-you-go financing, however, makes the financial 
status of the social security system sensitive to economic and 
demographic developments. Short-run problems can arise if 
economic fluctuations adversely affect receipts or outlays 
and contingency reserves are not adequate to cover the 
resulting deficits. Long-run financing problems can arise if 
the size of the beneficiary population increases relative to the 
working population and the full extent of this shift has not 
been taken into account in the financing provisions.
In 1983, the social security system faced both of these dif 
ficulties. The system was confronted with an immediate 
short term cash flow problem and a conceptually distinct 
long-run imbalance between revenues and outlays. The 
short-run difficulties were almost entirely the result of the 
unanticipated poor performance of the economy during the 
1970s, while the long-run deficits were primarily attributable 
to projected cost increase associated with the rising ratio of 
beneficiaries to covered workers after the turn of the cen 
tury.
Short-Run Financial Difficulties. The year 1972 is a useful 
point from which to trace the origins of the short-run finan 
cial cirses, since legislation passed in that year introduced a 
new social security financing and benefit schedule. For the 
first time, benefits would be adjusted automatically to keep 
pace with inflation and the taxable wage base would increase 
each year to reflect the growth in average wages. In 
retrospect, the 1972 legislation contained two problems.
The first was a flaw in the indexing procedure which, 
under assumptions of high future inflation rates, caused the 
replacement rate (the ratio of benefits to preretirement earn 
ings) to increase over time. The second was a forecasting er 
ror which resulted in tax rates that were based on overly op-
15
timistic economic assumptions. Essentially, the social securi 
ty Trustees assumed that the economy in the 1970s would 
operate at roughly the level experienced during the 1960s. A 
pay-as-you-go system with automatic indexing provisions is 
very sensitive to economic conditions, particularly to the 
relationship between the rate of price increase and the rate of 
wage growth. Tax revenues vary with the growth of wages, 
while benefits rise with increases in the consumer price index.
In order to understand the sensitivity of the social security 
system to forecasting errors, consider the effect on a trust 
fund (equal to one year's outgo) of first overestimating the 
growth of wages by 2 percentage points. 1 If wages grow by 2 
percentage points less than projected, payroll tax revenues 
will fall 2 percent short of the anticipated level and, where 
balance had been predicted between revenues and expen 
ditures, a 2 percent shortfall will emerge. This shortfall will 
be covered by drawing down trust fund reserves and the 
reserve ratio (the ratio of reserves on hand to annual expen 
ditures) will fall by 2 percentage points from the level 
originally projected. Even if wages grow in all subsequent 
years by the rate forecasted, the level of average wages, and 
hence tax revenues, will continue to be 2 percent lower than 
projected. The revenue-expenditure gap will never close, and 
in each subsequent year the 2 percent shortfall will require a 
transfer from the trust fund, causing the fund ratio to be 
another 2 percentage points lower than projected. In other 
words, after four years the one-shot error in forecasting 
wage growth will cause the trust fund ratio to be 8 percentage 
points lower than projected.
Should the forecasting error persist, that is, actual wage 
growth continue to fall below projected growth for several 
years, then the financial health of the program deteriorates 
far more rapidly. The social security actuaries have 
developed a simple rule of thumb that relates the difference
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between the actual and projected reserve ratio (ARR) in a 
given year (n) to the forecasting error (ERR) in each year (t):
n
ARR= 2 (n-(t-l)) ERRt 
t=l
According to this rule, a persistent 2 percentage point 
discrepancy between actual and projected wage growth 
reduces the reserve ratio by 2 percentage points after one 
year, 6 points after two years, 12 points after three years and 
20 points after four years.
On the other hand, if the error is one of overestimating the 
inflation rate by 2 percentage points, benefits, which are in 
dexed to inflation, will be 2 percent less than projected. 
Thus, a one-shot error in forecasting inflation will allow the 
trust fund to increase each year by roughly 2 percentage 
points, while a persistent error will allow the trust fund to in 
crease by 2, 6, 12 and 20 percentage points after the first, sec 
ond, third and fourth year as discussed above.
As you can see, a 2 percent error in forecasting both wage 
growth and inflation would have largely offsetting effects 
and virtually no impact on the financial status of the pro 
gram. In contrast, overestimating wage growth and 
underestimating inflation each by 2 percent would have a 
devastating effect on trust fund reserves. Hence, the key 
relationship is not the level of wage growth and inflation, but 
the difference between the rate of growth of wages and the 
rate of increase in prices. This number is generally referred 
to as the real wage differential. 2
When the new tax and benefit schedules were established 
in 1972, it was assumed that the real wage differential would 
return to the trend rate of growth set in the 1960s (see Table 
2). That is, the social security revenue and outlay projections 
were based on a real wage differential of 2.25 percent per 
year. Under this assumption, the reserve ratio would have re-
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mained fairly steady at 80 percent. Over the next five years, 
however, that is, from 1973 to 1977, the real wage differen 
tial actually averaged -0.3 percent rather than 2.25 percent. 
Primarily because of this difference, social security began to 
run annual deficits, which required annual transfers from 
the trust fund, so that by 1977 the reserve ratio had fallen to 
less than one-half of the projected 80 percent. 3
Table 2
Annual Percent Change in Prices and Average Covered Wages,













































SOURCE: Social Security Administration, Office of the Actuary, 1983 Annual Report of 
the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability In 
surance Trust Funds (GPO, May 1983), Table 10, pp. 37-38 and Table 14, p. 51; and Social 
Security Bulletin, Annual Statistical Supplement, 1982 (GPO 1982), Table 16, p. 21. 
a. The difference between the percentage increase in average annual wages and the percen 
tage increase in the annual CPI.
b. The ratio of reserves on hand at the end of one year to total expected expenditures the 
next year.
c. Excludes reserves borrowed from HI trust fund.
Legislation passed in 1977 dramatically revised the social 
security financing and benefit provisions in order to restore 
balance to the program. However, once again the tax 
schedule was set on the assumption that historical rates of
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real wage growth would reappear, that is, that the real wage 
differential would averaged roughly 2.0 percent from 1978 
through 1982. After 1977, however, the rate of price increase 
exceeded the rate of earnings growth producing persistent 
negative real wage differentials that averaged -1.7 percent 
over the 1978-82 period. With inadequate revenues, the 
system once again began to run annual deficits that resulted 
in a rapid decline in trust fund reserves, leading to the need 
for financing changes in 1983.
Long-Run Problems. Social security's long-run financing 
problems began to appear after 1973, when the social securi 
ty actuaries started to incorporate developing demographic 
trends into the long-run projections. In the next few years, 
the projected 75-year deficit worsened steadily as the flaw in 
the indexing provision and high forecasted inflation rates 
caused continuing increases in projected replacement rates. 
The 1977 legislation stabilized replacement rates and thereby 
substantially reduced the long-run deficit (from 8.2 percent 
of taxable payrolls to 1.4 percent), but further revisions in 
demographic assumptions and lowered real wage growth 
projections after 1977 forced the 75-year deficit to increase 
gradually to a level of 1.82 percent of taxable payrolls by 
1982. Thus, both demographic and economic factors deter 
mine the long-run financial status of the social security pro 
gram.
The demographic factors are important because they 
determine the number of people who will be receiving 
benefits as compared to the number of workers who will be 
paying taxes. In the case of those people already born, the 
key demographic variable is the mortality rate. Although 
most of the startling gains in life expectancy during this cen 
tury are attributable to a substantial reduction in neonatal 
mortality and diminution of childhood diseases, the life ex 
pectancy of older persons has also increased significantly.
19
The life expectancy for men at age 65 has risen from 11.9 
years in 1940, when social security benefits were first paid, to 
14.0 in 1980 and is projected to increase to 17.5 years by 2050 
under the Trustees' intermediate mortality assumptions (see 
Table 3). The comparable figures for women are more 
dramatic, increasing from 13.4 years in 1940 to 18.3 in 1980 
and projected to rise to 23.1 in 2050 under the intermediate 
assumptions. The Trustees' pessimistic projections, which 
ironically involve less likelihood of early death, assume that 
by 2050 both men and women will live roughly 3.5 years 
longer, while the optimistic assume they will die two years 
sooner.
The size of the future workforce that will be available to 
support the retired population is determined in large part by 
the fertility rate (the expected average number of lifetime 
births for women currently entering childbearing age). Since 
1800, the fertility rate has declined persistently, although it 
deviated temporarily from this trend during the 1945-60 
post-World War II baby boom. After 1960, the fertility rate 
resumed its decline, plummeting from its prevailing level of 
3.65 to a low of 1.74 in 1976. Since 1976, the rate has fluc 
tuated between 1.76 and 1.86.
Revised fertility assumptions introduced in 1974 had a ma 
jor impact on the projected long-run costs of the system. For 
several years prior to 1974, total fertility was assumed to 
level off at an ultimate rate of 2.55 under the Trustees' in 
termediate assumptions. The 1974 Trustees' Report, 
however, incorporated the much lower fertility experience of 
the early 1970s and projected under the intermediate 
assumptions an ultimate fertility rate of 2.1, a rate that pro 
duces zero population growth. The intermediate fertility rate 
assumption was lowered again in the 1976 Trustees' Report, 
but was then raised back to the 2.1 level in 1977, where it re 
mained through 1982. The most recent social security projec-
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tions assume an ultimate fertility rate of 2.0 under the 
intermediate assumptions; under the more pessimistic 
scenario, the fertility assumption is 1.6 and for the optimistic 
2.3.
Table 3
Fertility, Life Expectancy, and Beneficiaries per Hundred Workers 
1940-1980 and Projections for 1990-2050, Selected Years
Beneficiaries 


































1990 2.01 14.5 19.2
2010 2.30 15.0 19.9
2030 2.30 15.4 20.4
2050 2.30 15.8 20.9
Intermediate (Alternative IIB)
1990 1.90 15.1 19.9
2010 2.00 16.1 21.3
2030 2.00 16.8 22.2
2050 2.00 17.5 23.1
Pessimistic (Alternative III)
1990 1.75 15.7 20.7
2010 1.60 17.6 23.0
2030 1.60 19.2 24.9













SOURCE: Social Security Administration, Office of the Actuary, 1983 Annual Report of 
the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivor's Insurance and Disability Trust 
Funds (GPO, May 1983), Table 11, p. 40 and Table 28, pp. 75 and 76. 
n.a. = not available.
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The seemingly small differences in the fertility and mor 
tality rates that are incorporated into the alternative projec 
tions produce dramatic differences in the ratio of 
beneficiaries to workers when compounded over a long 
period of time. The intermediate demographic assumptions 
imply that the number of beneficiaries per hundred workers 
will increase from 30 in 1984 to 50 by the year 2050; the 
lower fertility and longer life expectancy incorporated in the 
pessimistic assumptions produce 73 beneficiaries for each 
hundred workers, while the higher fertility and greater mor 
tality in the optimistic assumptions imply 37 beneficiaries per 
hundred workers. With a pay-as-you-go system, an increase 
in the beneficiary/worker ratio implies an proportional in 
crease in costs as a percentage of payrolls.
Long-run cost increases due to demographic shifts could 
be offset, however, by greater productivity on the part of the 
working population. The difficulty has been that the increas 
ingly adverse demographic projections have been accom 
panied by steadily worsening economic assumptions. The 
projected real wage differential has been reduced several 
times from 2.25 percent in 1973 to the present projection of 
1.5 percent, reflecting the low levels of productivity growth 
experienced during the 1970s. With only modest projected 
increases in productivity, a consensus emerged that current 
fertility and mortality trends would result in a significant in 
crease in social security costs and that additional funds 
would be required to finance the program in the twenty-first 
century.
///. The Social Security Amendments of 1983
In response to the continuing deterioration in both the 
short- and long-run financial position of the social security 
system and the inability of Congress to agree upon a solu 
tion, President Reagan in December 1981 established a 
bipartisan National Commission on Social Security Reform.
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After more than a year of debate, the Commission finally 
proposed a delicately balanced package of tax increases, 
benefit cuts, and extension of coverage, which was projected 
to produce $166 billion between 1983 and 1990. These 
changes also eliminated two-thirds of the long-run deficit 
that was projected under the intermediate assumptions to 
arise after the turn of the century as the baby boom starts to 
retire (see Table 4). In the process of adopting the Commis 
sion's recommendations, Congress also introduced an exten 
sion of the normal retirement age to close the remaining gap 
between outlays and expenditures over the next 75 years. 
Several other provisions were also adopted in an attempt to 
stabilize the financing of the system and prevent repeated 
short term crises.
Short-Run Impact: 1983-1989. The two largest producers 
of additional short-term revenues, each contributing nearly 
one-quarter of the total increase over the 1983-1989 period, 
were the proposals to delay for six months the automatic 
cost-of-living adjustment on retirement and disability 
benefits4 and the provision to accelerate the OASDI payroll 
tax rate increases that were already scheduled to take effect 
in 1985 and 1990. 5 Another major contributor to the 
system's finances, accounting for roughly 15 percent of the 
total short-run revenues produced by the legislation, was the 
proposal to tax 50 percent of social security benefits—the 
half that is generally associated with the employer's share of 
the payroll tax—for higher income recipients and to direct 
the new receipts to the OASDI trust funds. 6
The legislation produced another 10 percent of the short- 
run revenue increases by increasing the tax rate for self- 
employed people. While in the past the self-employed have 
paid taxes equal to about 75 percent of the combined 
employee and employer contributions for OASDI and 50 
percent for HI, under the new legislation they will pay 100 
percent of the combined employee-employer rate. In order to
23
allow for the portion of the self-employed tax that cor 
responds to the employer's share, the self-employed will be 
allowed to deduct one-half their payroll tax liability for per 
sonal income tax purposes. 7
Table 4
Projected Cost Impact on the OASDI Program 








1. Delay COLA from July to January 39.4 0.30
2. Accelerate scheduled rate increases 39.4 0.03
3. Tax 50% of OASDI benefits for
higher-income people 26.6 0.61
4. Increase tax rate for self-employed 18.5 0.19
Coverage extension
5. Cover all nonprofit employees
and new federal workers 21.8 0.38
6. Ban withdrawal of state/local employers 3.2 0.06
Other
7. Payment from general revenues for military service
credits and uncashed checks 17.7 0.01
8. Benefit changes3 -0.4 -0.13
Total 166.2 +1.38b 
Extension of retirement age -- 0.71 
_____Total___________________________166.2_______2.09
SOURCE: Social Security Administration, Office of the Actuary, 1983 Annual Report of 
the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivor's Insurance and Disability Trust 
Funds (GPO, May 1983); and unpublished data.
a. Benefit changes include the following: Eliminating windfall benefits for persons with 
pensions from noncovered employment; continuing benefits for remarried disabled 
widow(er)s and for divorced widow(er)s; indexing deferred widow(er)'s benefits based on 
the lesser of wages and prices; permitting divorced aged spouse to receive benefits when 
husband is eligible; and increasing benefit rate for disabled widow(er)s aged 50-59 to 71.5 
percent of primary benefit. Also included in this figure, however, is $1 billion increase in 
revenue that results from accelerating state and local tax collections, 
b. Total effect of reforms on trust funds as percent of payroll is not the sum of individual 
percentages. Rather the total reflects the interaction of individual reforms upon one 
another, including the following additional reforms: taxation of certain salary plans, alter 
ing of the earnings test and adjustment of self-employment income.
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Roughly 15 percent of the total increase in short term 
revenues was gained from extending coverage to new federal 
employees and the uncovered workers in the nonprofit sec 
tor8 and from banning future withdrawals of state and local 
employers. 9 The remaining 10 percent of short term revenues 
came from the proposal to make a payment from general 
revenues to the OASDI trust funds to compensate the system 
for gratuitous military service wage credits granted before 
1983 and to provide reimbursement for social security checks 
issues but never redeemed. 10
The Long Run and Extension of the Retirement Age. In 
addition to raising a projected $166 billion over the period 
1983-1989, the National Commission's proposals enacted in 
the 1983 Amendments eliminated two-thirds of the 75-year 
deficit. 11 Although the Commission members who had voted 
in favor of the consensus package had agreed that the long 
range deficit should be reduced to approximately zero, they 
were unable to agree on a specific proposal to accomplish 
this. Members selected by the Democratic leadership sup 
ported an increase in contribution rates in 2010 (about 0.5 
percent of earnings for the employee and a like amount for 
the employer), while the remaining designees favored a 
gradual increase in the retirement age.
Congress opted for extending the retirement age as a 
means of eliminating the long-run deficit. As a result of the 
1983 Amendments, the retirement age will rise to 66 by 2009, 
then to 67 by 2027. 12 People can still elect early retirement at 
62, but benefits paid to early retirees will be reduced by 25 
percent in 2009 and by 30 percent in 2027. Early retirees are 
currently penalized 20 percent. Raising the retirement age 
reduces long-run costs by 0.71 percent of taxable payrolls, 
thereby creating a small surplus in the OASDI program over 
the 75-year projection period under the intermediate 
assumptions.
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Revenue Stabilizers. The 1983 Amendments also contain 
ed three provisions designed to improve the system*s ability 
to continue paying benefits on a timely basis even during 
adverse economic conditions. These include a speed-up in 
monthly transfers from the Treasury, an extension of inter- 
fund borrowing, and a revised indexing procedure.
Normalizing Transfers: To protect against potential cash 
flow problems created by the uneven way in which benefits 
are paid and taxes are transferred to social security, Con 
gress introduced a revised procedure for crediting taxes to 
the trust funds. Under the previous procedures benefits were 
paid on the third of the month, creating the need for high 
balances in the OASDI trust fund during the first week. 
Taxes, however, were transferred to the trust funds daily, 
based on Treasury estimates of amounts collected. Under the 
revised procedure, the Treasury is authorized to estimate 
amounts to be collected in a given month and transfer such 
sums to the trust funds on the first or second day of the 
month. This technical procedure will help ensure that the 
cash is available at the time benefit payments are made.
Extending Interfund Borrowing: Amendments to the Om 
nibus Reconciliation Act, passed on December 29, 1981, 
authorized borrowing through December 1982 among the 
OASI, DI, and HI trust funds to finance deficits up to June 
1983. The OASI fund borrowed $17.5 billion from the other 
funds ($5.1 billion from DI and $12.4 billion from HI) in 
November and December 1982 in order to ensure benefit 
payments through June 1983. The 1983 Social Security 
Amendments extended the authority for interfund borrow 
ing for calendar years 1983-1987 with the provision that all 
principal and interest be paid by the end of 1989. 13
Revising the COLA: As noted above, the short term fi 
nancing problem in social security was entirely the result of 
the unanticipated poor performance of the economy during
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the past few years. Tax rates were set on the assumption that 
taxable wages would grow at the rate of increase in prices 
plus an additional amount for productivity growth. After 
1977, however, the traditional relationship between price 
and wages was reversed and price increases exceeded wage 
growth. With prices rising faster than wages, benefits, which 
are linked to the consumer price index, increased faster than 
payroll tax revenues, which are dependent on the growth in 
wages. As a result, trust fund balances were rapidly depleted.
In an attempt to avoid this problem in the future, Con 
gress established that if OASDI reserves ever drop below 15 
percent (20 percent beginning in 1989) of the following year's 
planned outlays, the automatic cost-of-living adjustment 
would be based on the lower of the CPI increase or the in 
crease in average wages until the trigger ratio is restored. 
Subsequently, when the reserves reach 32 percent of outlays, 
benefits would be adjusted to make up for any payments that 
were less than those called for by the price adjustment. The 
payback would occur only so long as reserves met the 32 per 
cent standard. This change will help avoid a repetition of the 
recent short-run financial crisis.
IV. Some Uncertainties
With any luck in terms of the performance of the economy 
and demographic developments, the financial package 
enacted in the 1983 Amendments should ensure the solvency 
of the retirement and disability programs for the next 75 
years. The need for luck, however, highlights the fact that 
some uncertainties surround both the short-run and long-run 
outlook for the social security system. These uncertainties 
have little to do with the intrinsic health of the program, but 
rather with the fact that tax rates are set on the basis of 
assumed economic and demographic developments and the 
revenues produced by these tax rates will provide inadequate 
or excessive if the actual performance of the economy differs
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from that projected. In order to assess the reliability of the 
projections, it is useful to identify some of the major uncer 
tainties and estimate the magnitude of their potential impact 
on the financial status of the program. This exercise should 
provide some comfort to those who continue to worry about 
the solvency of the social security program, since the analysis 
reveals that potential deviations from the assumed perfor 
mance would require relatively minor increases in OASDI 
tax rates.
1984-1989: Economic Performance. For the period from 
now through 1989, the 1983 social security package was con 
structed so that the system would be adequately financed not 
only under the Trustees' intermediate economic assump 
tions, but also under the more pessimistic scenario. Most of 
the additional revenues under the pessimistic assumptions 
are attributable to the revised indexing procedure, whereby 
benefits are adjusted by the lesser of increases in prices or 
wages when trust fund reserves are low. The problem is that 
during the 1970s the economy performed even more poorly 
than the social security Trustees' pessimistic assumptions 
and, therefore, a legitimate question can be raised about 
whether the revenue and outlay projections for the rest of the 
1980s are realistic.
In fact, no mechanism exists to answer that question; in- 
sead, the only basis for assessment is to compare the social 
security assumptions with those of independent forecasters. 
As of April 1983, the month the 1983 Amendments were 
signed into law, the projections of the private forecasters 
clustered around the social security Trustees' intermediate 
and pessimistic assumptions and updated forecasts from 
Data Resources, Inc. and Chase Econometrics show the 
private projections bracketing these assumptions. Thus, the 
social security forecasts appear to be based on reasonable 
assumptions about future economic trends (see Table 5).
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Table 5
Comparison of Projections, as of Fourth Quarter 1983,
of the Real Wage Differential3 by Social Security
and Private Forecasters, 1984-1989



































SOURCE: Social Security Administration, Office of the Actuary, "Possible 'Automatic 
Operations' in 1984-85," memorandum (November 16, 1983), Table 1 and unpublished 
data; and Data Resources, Inc. and Chase Econometrics/Interactive Data Corp., projec 
tions based on data available before December 30, 1983.
a. The difference between the percentage increase in average annual wages in covered 
employment and the percentage increase in the annual CPI for all wage and salaried 
workers.
b. Since the private forecasters do not project wages in covered employment, wage growth 
is calculated on the basis of wages and salaries per worker in the private sector. For Chase 
and DRI standard long-term forecasts were used, moderate growth and tend, respectively.
Moreover, the really difficult period for social security 
financing is only the four years 1984 through 1987, since 
revenues will jump markedly in 1988, when a scheduled 
OASDI tax rate increase of 0.36 percent each for the 
employee and employer takes effect. (Another 0.14 percent 
increase becomes effective in 1990.) Little likelihood of an 
economic downturn exists for 1984 and while a serious reces 
sion in 1985 could cause some problems, such a development 
is very unlikely. By 1986, even with a repetition of the 
disasterous conditions of 1979 and 1980, the OASI and DI 
trust funds should have adequate reserves to continue 
payments through 1988 when the new revenues will be 
available. In addition to their own reserves, the OASI and DI
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funds can borrow from the HI trust fund until 1988. The 
combination of borrowing capability, substantial reserves, 
and a reasonably health economic outlook makes the 
possibility of another short term social security financing 
crisis very unlikely. 14
1990-2020 Accumulation of Trust Fund Reserves. In 
marked contrast to the 1980s, the outlook for OASDI finan 
cing for the period 1990-2020 has always been favorable. The 
primary reason is demographic. The low fertility rates during 
the late 1920s and the 1930s will be reflected in a con 
siderable reduction in the rate of increase in the population 
over age 65 during the 1990s and the first decade of the 
twenty-first century. While the average annual increase in 
the number of persons over 65 will be about 600,000 during 
the 1980s, the net increase will drop to around 400,000 a year 
under the intermediate assumptions between 1990 and 2010 
in spite of the improvement in the mortality rate. At the 
same time, the baby boom generation born after World War 
II will continue to swell the labor force. As a result, the ratio 
of beneficiaries to workers, which has increased continually 
since 1940, is estimated to remain stable for the next 20 to 30 
years at its current level of roughly 30 beneficiaries per hun 
dred workers. With a stable ratio of beneficiaries to workers, 
even modest productivity gains will reduce the cost of social 
security as a percent of payroll.
At the same time costs are projected to decline, revenues 
are scheduled to increase since a combined employee- 
employer payroll tax increase of 1.0 percent is slated to take 
effect by 1990. With lower costs and higher revenues, the 
retirement and disability program is projected to run 
substantial annual surpluses and the ratio of assets to outlays 
is estimated to increase from 38 percent in 1990 to 538 per 
cent by 2020 under the intermediate assumptions. These ac 
cumulated reserves are then scheduled to be drawn down to 
cover annual deficits in the years between 2020 and 2057.
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During the period 1990-2020, almost no uncertainties exist 
about the adequacy of social security financing. Even under 
the pessimistic mortality and economic assumptions the 
system will run surpluses until 2013 and have positive trust 
fund balances until 2020. Should the economy perform more 
poorly than the pessimistic assumptions, particularly should 
the real wage differential fall below 1 percent, revenues will 
still be adequate to cover benefit commitments, although not 
sufficient to produce substantial surpluses.
The uncertainty surrounding social security financing dur 
ing the period 1990-2020 arises then not from possible 
adverse economic or demographic developments, but rather 
from the possibility of congressional action. The major ques 
tion is whether Congress will allow a substantial accumula 
tion of assets in the OASDI trust funds or whether it will 
divert scheduled payroll taxes to finance other programs or 
simply not allow the 1990 rate increase to take effect. If 
reserves are not accumulated during the period, then tax 
rates will have to be raised after 2020 in order to finance the 
annual deficits on a current cost basis. It is important to 
note, however, that the rate hike that would be required if 
reserves are not accumulated is fairly modest—roughly 1 
percent each for the employee and employer under the in 
termediate assumptions (see Table 6).
The Role of the Hospital Insurance Program. A major 
obstacle to the buildup of assets in the OASDI trust fund 
may be the financial requirements of the Hospital Insurance 
program. Although the HI trust fund was a source of 
strength during the recent financial crisis, it faces serious 
financing problems in the near future. Unless further policy 
changes are implemented, the Congressional Budget Office 
projects the depletion of the HI fund by the end of the 
decade. The deficits would be small initially, but they would 
increase each year so that by 1995 the annual deficit would
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be $60 billion and the cumulative deficits would total over 
$200 billion.
Table 6
Estimated Average Cost Rate, Average Total Income Rate 
and Actuarial Balance for OASDI, and HI Trust Funds, 
Under Three Assumptions, Selected Periods, 1983-2057
Period










































































SOURCE: Social Security Administration, Office of the Actuary, 1983 Annual Report of 
the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability In 
surance Trust Funds (GPO, May 1983), Table 31, pp. 79-80; and 1983 Annual Report of 
the Board of Trustees of the Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund, Table 11, p. 47.
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Projected deficits could be substantially lower if cost- 
containment efforts are successful. For example, the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services has the power to set 
hospital reimbursement rates after 1985. If the Secretary 
decided to limit the increase in payments per admission to 
only 1 percentage point mre than the rate of increase of 
hospital input prices, the depletion date for the HI trust fund 
would be postponed until 1992 and the cumulative deficit 
would amount to roughly $85 billion by 1995.
Even with successful cost-containment efforts, therefore, 
some residual deficits appear almost inescapable. Hence, it is 
quite possible that Congress may decide to cover some of HI 
deficit by reallocating to the Hospital Insurance trust fund a 
portion of the payroll tax revenues now scheduled to go into 
the retirement and disability programs after 1990.
2020-2057: Demographic and Economic Assumptions. 
The financial solvency of the social security program after 
the year 2020 hinges crucially on demographic developments 
being in line with the social security Trustees' intermediate 
projections and to a somewhat lesser extent on productivity 
growth producing an adequate real wage differential.
Demographic Projections: The intermediate assumption 
of the social security Trustees, that the fertility rate will in 
crease from its current level of 1.8 to an ultimate value of 2.0 
by 2005, is slightly higher than the most recent projections by 
the Census Bureau. Until October 1982, the Census Bureau's 
"middle" series had assumed a long-run fertility rate of 2.1, 
the rate that produces zero population growth over the long- 
run. Now the Census assumes that fertility rates will remain 
fairly steady, increasing slightly from 1.80 to 1.96 in 2000 
and then decreasing gradually to 1.9 births per woman in 
2050. Supporting the somewhat higher social security projec 
tions, however, is the fact that data on expected births in 
dicate that young women continue to expect to have more
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than two children over their lifetimes. Thus, the social 
security intermediate projection of a long-run fertility rate of 
2.0 appears more likely than either the optimistic or 
pessimistic projections of 2.3 or 1.6, respectively. That is, it 
would be very difficult to make a convincing case for a fer 
tility rate assumption substantially different from that incor 
porated in the Trustees' intermediate projections. 15
Economic Assumptions: While the central projections 
seem to be based on realistic demographic assumptions, they 
may incorporate a somewhat optimistic assumption about 
the rate of productivity growth. The intermediate projec 
tions of the retirement and disability funds are based on an 
assumed long-run real wage differential of 1.5 percent. 
Although this number is considerably below the 3.0 percent 
differential experienced in the 1950s and the 2.1 percent dur 
ing the 1960s, it exceeds the average of 1.2 percent over the 
last 30 years. In addition, the real wage differential of 1.5 
percent implies long-run productivity gains of 2.1 percent, 
which is somewhat higher than most estimates. 16
The interesting fact, however, is that the long-run costs of 
the program are not all that sensitive to the real wage dif 
ferential. For example, if the long-run real wage differential 
were 1 percent instead of 1.5 percent, the cost of the system 
in the 2020-2057 period would be roughly 1.0 percent of tax 
able payrolls higher and the cost of the program over the en 
tire 75-year forecasting horizon would be 0.8 percent higher. 
This would mean that instead of being in long-run balance, 
the system would have a 75-year deficit of 0.8 percent of tax 
able payrolls. To put this deficit in perspective, it must be 
compared with the total cost of the program, which would be 
roughly 13.7 percent of taxable payrolls. Of this total cost, 
12.9 percent would be covered by scheduled payroll taxes, 
while 0.8 percent would be unfunded. In other words, the 
deficit produced by a real wage differential of 1 percent 
rather than 1.5 percent would amount to only 6 percent of
34
program expenditures over the 75 years. Under the tradi 
tional rule of thumb adopted by the social security Trustees, 
the system is considered to be in close actuarial balance if 
revenues are equal to plus or minus 5 percent of planned 
outlays. Thus, even a substantial deviation from the assumed 
real wage growth will require only a relatively modest in 
crease in the payroll tax rate to restore financial balance to 
the retirement and disability programs.
After 2057. To even discuss the outlook for social security 
after the year 2057 verges on the ridiculous. It is comparable 
to having concluded in 1909 that a program was adequately 
financed through 1984 and then worrying about what was 
going to happen in 1985. Nevertheless, for the sake of com 
pleteness, it is probably useful to mention two factors that 
pertain to the end of the forecast period. The first is that the 
reserves that are scheduled to accumulate during the period 
1990-2020 will be exhausted by 2057. Hence, the OASDI 
payroll tax rate will have to be raised under the intermediate 
assumptions by roughly 1 percentage point each for 
employees and employers in the middle of the next century to 
cover the costs of the program.
The second factor is that because of the mechanics of 
calculating the long-run financial status of the program, 
future estimates will begin to show small deficits even if the 
intermediate assumptions turn out to be completely ac 
curate. This will occur because the 75-year projection is a 
rolling average of individual years, and as time progresses 
the near-term years of projected surpluses will be replaced by 
the years of deficit after 2057, the end of the current projec 
tion horizon. The magnitude of this phenomenon is very 




Congress passed major legislation in 1983 which raised 
taxes, reduced benefits, and broadened coverage in order to 
provide financial balance to the social security program over 
the next 75 years. The preceeding analysis indicates that the 
1983 Amendments have done the job. In the critical period 
between now and the 1988 rate hike, the system appears ade 
quately financed even under the pessimistic set of economic 
assumptions. Moreover, the economic forecasts used by 
social security are consistent with those prepared by private 
firms.
Between 1988 and 2020, there is little question that 
revenues will be sufficient to cover promised benefits. In 
deed, the major question is how large the trust funds will 
become as the system experiences successive annual 
surpluses. This depends somewhat on economic and 
demographic developments, but the determining factor will 
be Congress' willingness to deviate from pay-as-you-go 
financing and allow an accumulation of reserves. If funds 
are needed to finance the Hospital Insurance program, a 
decision might be made to divert some of the scheduled 
payroll taxes to finance HI. Even in th event of such a diver 
sion, however, the system appears to have plenty of money 
for the next 40 years.
After 2020, the program starts to run annual deficits and a 
possibility exists that some additional financing might be re 
quired if either adequate reserves are not allowed to ac 
cumulate during the 1990-2020 period or the real wage dif 
ferential turns out to be lower than projected. Even if either 
of these events should occur, however, the size of the tax in 
crease that would be required to compensate appears 
relatively modest—perhaps 1 percent each for the employee 
and employer. Hence, the financing of the retirement and 




1. This discussion of the effect of forecasting errors is based on a presen 
tation by Lawrence H. Thompson, "Social Security Financing: Recent 
Problems and Current Uncertainties," prepared for annual meeting of 
Industrial Relations Research Association, San Francisco, December 30, 
1983 and on Dwight K. Bartlett and Joseph A. Applebaum, "Economic 
Forecasting: Effect of Errors on OASDI Fund Ratios," Social Security 
Bulletin 45 (1) (January 1982), pp. 9-14.
2. Because of the time lag in adjusting benefits, the level of inflation does 
have a small impact on the cost of the system even with a constant real 
wage differential. For example, the 75-year deficit would range from 
-0.33 percent of taxable payrolls to -(-0.36 percent as the underlying in 
flation rate ranged from 2 percent to 6 percent even with a constant real 
wage differential of 1.5 percent.
3. Other factors contributing to social security's financial problems were 
a higher-than-expected unemployment rate which further reduced 
revenues and an unprecedented increase in disability claims.
4. Since 1975 cost-of-living adjustments were made annually in June 
(payable in July) to reflect changes in the consumer price index (CPI), 
measured by the first quarter of the current year over the first quarter of 
the previous year. The legislation shifted the 1983 COLA from June to 
December and provided that all subsequent increases be awarded in 
December (payable in January), based on the elevel of the CPI in the 
third quarter of that year over the level in the third quarter of the 
previous year.
5. The 1983 legislation moved the scheduled 1985 OASDI rate increase to 
1984 and part of the scheduled 1990 increase to 1988. As a result, the 
1984 OASDI tax is 5.7 percent each for employers and employees and is 
slated to rise to 6.06 percent in 1988 and 6.2 percent in 1990. With a HI 
tax of 1.45 percent beginning in 1986, the total social security payroll tax 
will rise from its present level of 7.0 percent to 7.51 percent in 1988 and 
7.65 percent in 1990. In order to postpone the impact of the 1984 increase 
until 1985, however, the legislation provided employees a credit of 0.3 
percent of taxable wages so that net OASDI tax remains unchanged at 
5.4 percent for 1984.
6. One-half of social security benefits are subject to taxation if 50 per 
cent of the benefits, combined with other income plus certain nontaxable
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income, exceed $32,000 in the case of a married couple and $25,000 for 
single individuals.
7. The deduction becomes effective in 1990. In the interim, the tax in 
crease will be accompanied by a tax credit of 2.7 percent of taxable earn 
ings in 1984, 2.3 percent in 1985 and 2 percent in 1986 through 1989.
8. Before the 1983 Amendments, the social security system covered 90 
percent of jobs in paid employment. The 10 percent of workers who were 
not covered by social security included most federal civilian workers (2.4 
out of 2.7 million), about 30 percent of state and local employees (ap 
proximately 3 million), and 15 to 20 percent of employees of nonprofit 
organizations (up to 1 million). The 1983 Amendments extended 
coverage to all newly hired federal civilian employees and to uncovered 
workers in nonprofit institutions. For these groups, this provision not 
only eliminates the windfall component of benefits that arises when 
formerly uncovered workers have minimum coverage and profit from 
social security's progressive benefit formula, but also improves the pro 
tection for many workers, particularly in the area of disability and sur 
vivors insurance. The windfall component for those groups who con 
tinue to remain uncovered is partially eliminated in the legislation by 
modifying the benefit formula for persons with pensions from non- 
covered employment.
9. Since 1950 social security coverage for employees of the states and 
localities has been available on a voluntary basis through agreements be 
tween the political entity and the Secretary of Health and Human Ser 
vices. States could voluntarily terminate coverage with two years' ad 
vanced notice. Until the mid-1970s the number of employees leaving the 
system was always exceeded by the number of newly covered 
employees—in most years by 50,000 or more. After 1975, however, the 
number of workers for whom coverage was terminated exceeded the 
number of newly covered employees. These terminations not only reduc 
ed the payroll tax base, but also caused some employees to lose protec 
tion and created resentment on the part of other workers who were 
covered on a mandatory basis. To alleviate these problems, the 1983 
Amendments prohibited state and local governments from terminating 
coverage after April 14, 1983.
10. The military have been covered under social security since 1957, but 
military personnel pay contributions only on the cash paid to them. The 
government pays the costs of the benefit credits made on the basis of 
nonpecuniary allowances for room and board. However, the government
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did not make current payments for these credits, but rather transferred 
the money to the social security trust funds only when the benefits were 
paid. Moreover, prior to 1957, free credits of $160 per month were 
granted for service in the armed forces. These credits, too, were paid on 
ly after the benefits were awarded, and the cost was amortized over a 
long period of time. The 1983 Amendments provided for the OASDI 
trust funds to receive a lump-sum payment from the Treasury to make up 
for the back amounts owed by the government. In the future the OASDI 
trust funds will be reimbursed on a current basis for the employee and 
employer taxes on the benefit credits made in lieu of allowances for room 
and board.
11. The relative importance of the specific proposals on long-run costs 
and revenues, however, differed somewhat from their impact on the 
system in the short run. The change that had the greatest long range ef 
fect was the proposal to tax one-half of social security benefits. While the 
income limits initially restrict the taxation to less than 10 percent of the 
population, eventually about half of all beneficiaries will be affected. 
The proposal to bring employees of nonprofit institutions and newly 
hired federal workers under social security also has a favorable long 
range impact. The saving arises because an estimated 73 percent of those 
involved would have qualified for sizable social security benefits as a 
result of other employment even without the extension of coverage. 
Also, federal employees tend to have wages that are higher than average 
and, therefore, are entitled to less heavily weighted benefits.
12. Specifically, the age for full benefits will be increased to 66 by two 
months a year for six years so that provision would be fully effective 
beginning with those attaining age 62 in 2005 (66 in 2009); maintained at 
age 66 for people reaching are 62 in 2006-2016; increased by two months 
a year for people reaching age 62 in 2017-2022; and maintained at age 67 
for people reaching 62 after 2022.
13. The 1983 legislation puts restrictions on interfund borrowing, par 
ticularly: 1) interest must be paid monthly on any outstanding loans; 
2) no fund can borrow from the other in any month in which the other's 
trust fund ratio is under 10 percent; 3) in 1983-1987, each fund must 
repay loans whenever its fund ratio at yearend exceeds 15 percent; and 
4) in 1988-1989, the loan balance outstanding at the end of 1987 must be 
repaid in 24 equal monthly payments.
14. Some speculation has emerged that trust fund reserves may fall 
slightly below 15 percent in 1984 or 1985, triggering the revised indexing
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procedure. Even if this should occur, it would probably have no effect on 
benefits, since wages will almost certainly rise faster than prices. Hence, 
no changes in benefits or taxes are likely in the short run.
15. On the other hand, the enormous fluctuation experienced in fertility 
trends would argue against being too complacent about any projection of 
future fertility rates. The hazards of forecasting population growth can 
be easily demonstrated by historical experience. In 1943 it was 
authoritatively estimated that the 1980 United States population would 
be perhaps as low as 146 million, or perhaps be as high as 179 million; in 
1958 the corresponding low and high forecasts of the 1975 population 
were 231 million and 273 million; the event—a population of 228 
million—confounded both these projections. See Warren S. Thompson 
and P.K. Whelpten, "Estimates of the Future Population of the United 
States, 1940 to 2000," paper presented for the National Resources Plan 
ning Board (1943) and U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population 
Reports, "Illustrative Projections of the Population of the United 
States, by Age and Sex, 1960 to 1980," series P-25, No. 187 (GPO, 
1958).
16. An ultimate rate of productivity gains of 2.1 percent per year was 
derived from the projected real-wage differential of 1.5 percent per year 
by increasing it by 0.3 percent for the relative annual growth of fringe 
benefits; 0.2 percent for the average number of hours worked per week; 
and 0.1 percent for the average number of weeks worked per year.
